Using a standard linear version of the Bertrand duopoly model of competition, I analyse the effect on firm pricing behaviour of three prominent features of the U.S. antidumping system. I identify the circumstances under which these features eliminate dumping entirely as well as their effects on the profitability of the import-competing and foreign firms. The Byrd amendment, which has been the subject of a dispute between WTO members, is found to create price floors for domestic firms and paradoxically to increase the volume and total value of imports. D
Introduction
As tariffs on manufactured products have fallen with successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations and the signing of dozens of preferential trade agreements, economic analyses of remaining non-tariff barriers have grown in number (Baldwin, 1970; Laird and Yeats, 1990; Deardorff and Stern, 1998) . Anti-dumping statutes and tariffs have featured prominently in this research programme, not least because of the spread of such laws since their introduction 100 years ago, and over the past 20 years in particular (see, for example, the surveys of the relevant literature in Finger, 1993; Blonigen and Prusa, 2001) .
1 Moreover, legal practitioners and political scientists have begun to shed light on the non-market-related determinants of the design and operation of anti-dumping laws and on what might be termed the supply and demand for antidumping protection (Boltuck and Litan, 1991; Jackson and Vermulst, 1990; Nivola, 1993; Finger et al., 1982) . This relatively restrained scholarly literature has been augmented by blistering critiques and defences of anti-dumping in the print media, at international fora, and elsewhere (see, for example, Bovard, 1991; Mastel, 1998; Eckes, 1995 , and just about any open editorial on anti-dumping on the pages of the Wall Street Journal). An important feature of the implementation of anti-dumping laws is that there is considerable room for discretion by administering officials (see, for example, Clarida, 1995; Blonigen, 2003;  and the contributions to Boltuck and Litan, 1991) . Sometimes this discretion can be exercised in a manner that results in the calculation of foreign market values, dumping margins, and the like that have little or no bearing to the underlying legal rationales for the anti-dumping statutes, namely deterring certain types of international price discrimination and foreign market sales below average total costs.
2 This is not to suggest that officials are breaking the law, rather that they may be using the discretion available to them to respond to incentives to supply protection to influential domestic interests and constituencies. Indeed, when the latter are especially aggressive in pressing their case, the weight given to any information supplied by a foreign firm or to the underlying legal concepts that motivate the anti-dumping law may come a poor second and third to the bureaucratic imperative to supply protection. Forward-looking foreign firms may thus want to anticipate the effects of such bureaucratic discretion and temper any expectations as to the likelihood that prices changes on their part may reduce, for example, the likelihood of antidumping order being imposed. This paper focuses on one area where bureaucratic discretion can be very important, namely the calculation of the foreign market value that import prices will be subsequently be compared to after an anti-dumping order is put in place, and U.S. administrative practice is used to highlight this point. Although some nations' anti-dumping laws allow for the imposition of provisional ad-valorem duties to be levied once an order is imposed, the final amount of the duty typically depends on any (non-negative) difference between the implementing agency's estimate of the foreign market value and the prices charged on each import transaction.
3 Using a standard linear Bertrand duopoly model with differentiated products, I show how a foreign firm and its domestic rival might respond to the incentives created by various types of what I term pure bureaucratic discretion. By the latter, I mean that the agency sets the foreign market value used for computing the amount of duties owed in a way that is completely independent of (or unrelated to) the foreign firm's pricing behaviour or cost levels. 4 Furthermore, rather than specify the process by which the enforcement agency chooses the foreign market value I show,
